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This study evaluates the effectiveness of a pro-poor nation-wide health card program in 
Indonesia which provides free basic health care at public health facilities. To quantify the 
effect of the program, it departs from the traditional regression-based approach in the 
literature to employ propensity score matching to reduce the selection bias due to non-
random health card distribution. The setting of the program and the richness of the data 
set support this strategy in providing accurate estimates of the program’s effect on its 
recipients. The result finds that in general the health card program only has limited 
impact on the consumption of primary health care by its recipients. This finding suggests 
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  1I.   INTRODUCTION 
Inequalities in access to health care have become a prominent policy agenda in many 
countries worldwide. Interventions of various forms were introduced by governments and 
non-government institutions as an attempt to minimise these asymmetrical situation with 
targeted programs for the poor being the common theme. Some countries directly provide 
health goods (e.g., the United Kingdom) while others combine public provision with 
subsidised health insurance for the poor (e.g., Australia, Malaysia, Singapore). The 
common justification for subsidisation is that health care services are particularly costly 
for the poor yet they are more likely to face adverse health shocks (Wagstaff, 2005; 
Whitehead et al., 2001; Xu et al, 2003; Case et al., 2002). Further, it is believed that there 
are positive externalities from a healthy population.    
 
In Indonesia, health care payments are largely out-of-pocket and cash at the time of 
purchase or service provision. The health insurance market is underdeveloped with less 
than 20 percent of the population covered by at least one form if health insurance as at 
2000 (IFLS). As a result, sick individuals with subsistence or low income and without 
insurance may be unable to obtain the necessary medical treatment; 56 percent of the 
population lived on less than $2 per day. Health care utilisation rates are low and 
unchanged, despite marked increases in the incidences of both communicable and non-
communicable diseases. Restricted access to adequate health care has also been linked to 
critical health statistics, such as under-five mortality figure of 38 per 1,000 live births due 
to preventable factors (MoH) and the highest maternal mortality rate among Southeast 
Asian nations (WHO).  
 
The health card program of 1994 is one of the government’s major efforts to improve the 
nation’s health conditions by promoting equality in access to primary health care. It is a 
nation-wide project involving all public health facilities, including hospitals. The 
program targets poor households and provides full price subsidy to medical expenses at 
public health facilities by all members of the household. Health cards are distributed at 
the household level by the village heads as the program administrators, based on a list of 
criteria that reflects welfare. Substantial regional heterogeneity makes it implausible to 
  2have a common eligible rule, and so eligibility determination is essentially decentralised 
and varies across communities. In principle, there is no limit on the frequency of health 
card use, but recipient households can lose the health card if income increases with the 
re-assessment typically is performed annually. 
  
The aim of this study is to measure the effectiveness of the health card program. To my 
knowledge, this is the program’s first formal evaluation at the microeconomic level. So 
far, assessments are based on aggregate statistics on the number of health card 
disseminated in one area and the recorded number of patients with health card received 
by public health facilities (Widianto, H. at MoH, 2007, pers. comm., 12 January). Results 
form aggregate analyses however are likely to be contaminated with other factors. 
Accurate evaluation of the program is necessary, particularly in the face of constrained 
resources, as policymakers must ensure that ongoing programs are not wasteful. The 
outcome of this study therefore will provide valuable feedback to policymakers, and 
suggest appropriate directions for future policy.  
  
This thesis also contributes to the general health and development literature in at least 
three significant ways. First, it may extend our knowledge about the interaction between 
demand incentives, which health cards are a form of it, and health care choice in 
developing countries which we know very little about. Most of the existing evidences in 
the literature are based on developed countries, which have distinct environmental 
settings to developing countries. For example, in developing countries, transport and time 
costs associated with the subsidised care are often non-negligible, and consumption of 
traditional medicines is prevalent. In addition, public health facilities are often inadequate 
and rated as having low quality by potential patients (see Filmer et al., 2000 for cross 
countries review). In the presence of these other costs and readily accessible alternatives, 
it is not clear whether a price subsidy as a demand inducement will result in recipient 
households increasing their consumption of formal health care. In the literature, there 
have been numerous studies focusing on targeted programs in relatively poor countries, 
especially African countries, which find mixed conclusions about households’ response 
(for example Newman et al., 2002; Castro-Leal et al., 2000; Pradhan et al., 1998). 
  3However, evidence from middle-income developing countries like Indonesia is relatively 
thin.  
 
Second, as the evaluation method, this study employs the Propensity Score Matching and 
Difference-in-Differences (PSM-DID) estimator, which has gained popularity in labour 
economics to produce causal inference (Smith and Todd, 2000, 2005; Heckman et al., 
1997), but has not been widely used in the health literature. In non-experimental setting, 
it is well recognised that inferences drawn from comparing the outcomes of the program 
recipients and non-recipients are likely to be biased due to selection problems. The issue 
in evaluation studies therefore has centred on selection bias and the construction of the 
comparison group. Traditionally, health studies have relied on instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions to correct for sample selection bias, hypothesising that units are different in 
unobservable ways. However, it is known that valid instruments are rarely available, and 
IV regression’s results rely in strong assumptions for causal inference (Imbens and 
Angrist, 1994). PSM oppositely supposes that sample units are different by their observed 
characteristics, and does not require IV(s). In the case of the health card program, 
selection on observables may be more appropriate, as health card eligibility does not 
require households’ initiative to apply for the program, but is determined based on their 
state of economy that are observed by the program administrators. Further, the 
combination PSM and DID allows selection on unobservables, as long as they are time-
invariant. The reliability of PSM-DID to provide causal estimates, under reasonable 
conditions, has been found by many studies (see Smith and Todd, 2005; Heckman et al., 
1997, 1998; Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001).  
 
Third, this is a demand-side study that incorporates supply-side variations into the 
analysis. Commonly, supply variables are excluded from demand studies due to lack of 
data. Yet, it is known in the literature that supply influences demand either directly 
through additional arrangements or indirectly through increasing health awareness among 
potential patients. In fact, many data have supported this hypothesis by featuring positive 
correlation between health care utilisation rates and physician density (McGuire, 2000; 
  4Dow et al., 2000). Analyses without supply side factors therefore may be invalid due to 
omitted variable bias.  
 
The data used in this study comes from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) in 
1993 (IFLS1), 1997 (IFLS2) and 2000 (IFLS3). The IFLS may be the only large sample 
longitudinal study on Indonesian households. It is a very rich data source collected at the 
household and individual levels that supports the empirical strategy. Most studies in 
various literature on Indonesia use the national annual household survey (Susenas) by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, which is an ongoing large sample study but only repeated 
cross-sections. Alternatively, the IFLS is also nationally representative as it uses the same 
sampling frame as those constructed for Susenas in selecting its enumeration areas. 
Furthermore, the household survey is accompanied by community and facility surveys, 
which provide information about health care supply conditions in communities where 
households lived. The reliability of the data set is formally documented in Thomas et al. 
(2001).  
 
The results show that the health card program has only limited impact on its recipients’ 
health care consumption. The presence of a health card increases the number of 
visitations to public facilities by the younger household members, especially to receive 
curative treatments, but has no significant positive effect on other household members. 
However, the initial levels of health care consumption by children are very low. The 
other effect of health card availability is increasing contraceptive enrolments among 
eligible females in the recipient households, but in this case, the demand incentive was 
paralleled by supply expansion of contraceptive services in public health facilities in the 
late 1990s. Considering the health card program is fairly generous in its design, this 
finding may suggest that either a subsidy (or price-based incentive in general) to general 
health care is ill-suited as a form of intervention to increase health care utilisation, or 
there are factors that are counteracting the demand inducement, or both. As policy 
implications, program redesign or redirection of resources therefore may yield a larger 
impact. 
 
  5II.   BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
The health card program was designed to allow poor households to obtain at least basic 
health care services. Health cards are distributed at the household-level, and cover fully 
the costs of medical treatments of all household members at all public health facilities, 
including hospitals and village midwife. Covered services include basic outpatient and 
inpatient care, diagnostic testing, contraceptive treatments, and children and maternal 
care. In principle, there is no limit on the frequency of health card use, and neither the 
Ministry of Health nor the public facilities have a formal procedure in place to monitor 
the use of health card.  
 
Eligibility is determined using a list of criteria that reflects welfare, such as lack of 
permanent income source, failure to provide two basic meals per day and inability to 
purchase basic health care services. The village head in each community act as the 
program administrator and decides on the weights attached to each criterion. This 
procedure is used instead of the common fixed-income threshold rule because regional 
heterogeneity affects price and income levels, and accordingly poverty lines. Once 
household is identified as poor, health card is issued. No application by households is 
needed. Public health facilities are informed on the number of health card disseminated in 
the area, and are reimbursed based on user costs. Provision for this outlay is set according 
to historic records on the number of poor households in the area.
1 
 
In the past, there are only a few large scale health projects in the country that had been 
formally assessed. Gertler and Molyneaux (2000) investigate the effects of public 
contraceptive subsidies organised by the National Family Planning and Coordinating 
Board on contraceptive use and fertility rates. They use IV regressions to correct for non-
random program placement, and argue that district-level variables such as eligible 
population, per capita subsidy level and their lagged values are valid IVs. Several data 
sources are combined to provide 36 quarterly data for the decade 1985-1994. The 
                                                 
1 Since 2000, the health card program is reformed to be contained within a social system (JPKM) managed 
by a state-own insurance company. Under the reformed system, fund-holding entities were set up at district 
level to replace the central government in managing resource allocation and service provision in their areas. 
Nonetheless, the design of the health card program is unchanged.  
  6individual-level information is obtained from the contraception calendar of women in the 
1991 and 1994 annual Demographic and Health Survey while the remaining data sources 
are extracted from various unpublished Indonesian data sets. The study finds that the 
project has no impact on fertility rates (as measured by the proportion of women aged 15 
– 49 years old who gave birth in the district in that quarter), and only a small but 
significant impact on contraceptive prevalence in a district. For the latter, the study also 
finds that the effect of contraceptive subsidies is smaller than the effect of increased 
number of clinics.  
 
Pradhan et al. (2007) analyse the immediate impact of a World Bank project in 1998 as a 
response to increased poverty level post the 1997 financial crisis. The Social Safety Net 
(SSN) program transfers lump-sum payments to targeted districts to be allocated to 
different sectors. The study is based on Susenas data set, appended with administrative 
district data. To tackle selection problems, it relies on cross-sectional PSM by island 
(Indonesia is an archipelagic state) to match households in 1999 to households in 1998. 
Least Square regression is then applied on the matched sample to estimate the program 
effect. By exploiting variations in funds across districts, the study finds that spending in 
the health sector significantly increases (decreases) households’ outpatient contact rate at 
public (private) facilities by 0.1% point in a month time. 
 
There are only a handful of health evaluation studies that involve non-parametric 
approach, in particular PSM-DID. Three recent studies from developing countries that 
use matching are Trujillo et al. (2005) in analysing the impact of a targeted subsidised 
health insurance on health care use in Columbia, Galiani et al. (2005) in estimating the 
effect of privatisation of water system on children’s mortality in Argentina, and Wagstaff 
and Yu (2007) in examining the performance of a World Bank’s investment in China. All 
studies reported some positive effects of the studied program. The China project (which 
is a combination of demand and supply expansion) for instance reduces households’ out-
of-pocket health expenses, particularly on drugs, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
catastrophic health expenditure to poor households. The project however has no or even 
negative impact on the number of doctor visits. The problem in the study is lack of 
  7common support. Many observations have to be dropped to make the counterfactual and 
the program beneficiary samples comparable. Resultantly, the effect of the program is 
estimated tolerating observations that are just off-support. Hence, hitherto, there are very 
few convincing studies in the literature based on matching technique. One of the 
contributions of this thesis is to fill this gap by exploiting the availability of large rich 
data sets.  
  
III. METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this study is to accurately estimate the effect of health card availability 
on its recipients’ health care utilisation. Specifically, the interest is to compare outcomes 
of the recipients to the counterfactual, that is, their outcomes when health card is not 
available at the same point in time. The counterfactual however is never observed. If 
health cards are randomly distributed, its effect can be measured by comparing the 
outcomes of recipient and non-recipients. Let   denotes individual i’s health care 
utilisation at time  , where  = 0 indicates pre-treatment period and t = 1 indicates 
treatment period.   is the treatment indicator which takes a value of 1 if household is 





) 1 | ( = − = d Y Y E ATT
c d   .    (1) 
(1) is an unbiased estimator of the ATT as random allocation implies orthogonality of the 
outcome variable and the treatment status;  i i D Y ⊥ 1 . 
 
However, in non-experimental setting, there are at least two reasons to believe that 
treatment is not random. First, recipient and non-recipient households are different. For 
instance, it is suggested that poor households have low taste for formal medical care 
(Akin et al., 1998). If this is the case, then the ATT will be downwardly biased. Second, 
eligibility determination is decentralised and varies across communities. Selection by the 
program administrators may also relate to the outcome variables. In the absence of a 
controlled randomised experiment, the primary task therefore is to use estimation to 
create the counterfactual or control units under most reasonable conditions. The 
following discusses the matching technique in constructing these counterfactuals.  
 
  8In the presence of longitudinal data, matching technique can be combined with DID 
ates 
   (2) 
where 
estimator, which has been extensively used in policy evaluation studies. Let  0 t  indic
pre-treatment period and  1 t  indicates treatment period. The first underlying assumption 
behind matching in a longitudinal data context is: 





0 1 ⊥ − , 
X  is a vector of strictly exogenous var nt 
itional on 
iables that are unaffected by the treatme
or anticipation of the treatment (Heckman et al., 1998). Equation (2) states the 
conditional independence or ‘ignorability’ assumption which requires that cond
observables  X , the outcome of the control units progresses in the same way as that of the 
treated units had they not been treated. Health card distribution may not be random, and 
this is not ignorable with respect to the outcome variables. However, health card 
allocation becomes ignorable if all factors that are influencing the allocation and a




The second fundamental assumption is that it is possible to find the counterfactual of 
 tests for 
the fulfilment of thi rt 
hen there are many covariates to match however, matching can suffer from 
83) is to 
each treated unit in the control group. This is the common support condition; 
1 ) | 1 Pr( 0 < = < X D . Unlike in regression-based methods, matching explicitly
s condition, thereby avoiding “off-support” inferences. By off-suppo
we mean, attempt to establish the treatment effect when the treated and non-treated units 
in the data are incomparable, leading to biased ATT estimates (Heckman et al., 1997; 
Cobb-Clark and Crossley, 2003). 
 
W
dimensionality problem. One solution suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (19
match on a propensity score  ) (X P  that summarises information given by  X  A useful 
result is that under the above  ssumptions, the conditional independence assumptio
also applies for  ) (X P : 
two a n 
  .    (3) 
(3) is a weak requirement in the sense that it conditions on fixed-effects and does not rule 
out selection on the basis of time-invariant variables. The first fundamental assumption 
) ( |





  9requires there is no “hidden bias” due to unobserved factors affecting both treatment 
status and health care choice. In observational data, this endogeneity of treatment status 
common, and cross-sectional PSM estimator is generally inconsistent in this case. 
However, one may think these unobservables to be taste or tradition, which is household-
specific and changes very slowly, or not at all, over time. If so, the combination DI
PSM generates a powerful estimator of ATT by first eliminating the effects of time-
invariant unobservables, which is difficult to deal with in traditional cross-section 
matching, and then uses matching technique to construct counterfactual for each trea
unit (Smith and Todd, 2000).  
 




e only need mean conditional independence. The ATT 
ow can be written as: 
conditional difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. First-
differencing will eliminate effects of inherent or time-invariant hous onal 
ts, if 
 PSM method searches for a unit in the 
ntrol group with the closest propensity score to that treated unit. Treated units that are 
 
n
) 0 ), ( | ( ) 1 ), ( | (








t , (4) 
which essentially is the 
eholds’ and regi
characteristics. Meanwhile, double-differencing will eliminate macroeconomic effec
they are homogenous across units, as well as potential bias arising from differences in 
survey questionnaires. Later, I will explore the validity of the assumption of universal 
macroeconomic effects assumption. Given the two fundamental assumptions, equation 
(4) writes the consistent estimator of the ATT.  
  
To find a matching-pair for each treated unit, the
co
unable to find a match lie outside the region of common support, thus they are excluded 
in calculating the ATT. Notice that unlike regression approach, matching makes minimal 
assumption about the functional form of the relationship between health card availability
and health care utilisation, which is implicitly assumed to be linear in the standard 
regression method. Given the common support restriction, the sample-counterpart for the 
ATT can be written as: 
[ ] i D iC j jt jt ij it it w Y Y W Y Y ATT ∑ ∑ ∈∈ − − − = ) ( ) ( 0 1 0 1    (5) 
  10where   is the weight placed on a control unit  ij W j  for a treated  qu ) states 
the
as 




The standard errors are found by bootstrapping with 200 replications.  
 
unit i. E ation (5
that the ATT is found by comparing the change in outcomes of the tr ated unit with that 
of the counterfactual, which is given by the weighted average of the change in outcomes 
of the untreated units, where the weights reflect the propensity score. The weighting 
function may vary according to the selected definition of a close neighbourhood and this 
depends on the researchers rather than being implicit in the estimator, as in the case of 
linear regression. This flexibility in aggregating the treatment effect makes matching 
more amenable to heterogenous treatment effect context. Several possible definitions for 
ij W  include the nearest neighbour which gives zero weights to all matched pairs except 
 one closest to the treated unit, several matched pairs within a specified distance, or 
the entire sample of matched-pairs with a weighting function that accounts for relative 
closeness. In general, studies have favoured the latter definition, which maximises the 
sample size, with weights given by kernel weights (Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Heckman 
et al., 1997; Galiani et al., 2005). Another advantage of this method from the standard 
regression is that health care variables contain a lot of zeros, which is likely to create bi




non-parametric technique, but it would just bring back the dimensionality problem –, and 
the Kernel weights is assumed to be Gaussian. Since analytical formula to compute the 
standard error of the ATT estimates is not available, I follow the common practice to 
compute the standard errors using bootstrap method. With kernel weight, because it d
not run into the discontinuity that arises in other method, particularly in nearest neighbour 
matching, the reservations that have been forwarded about bootstrapping do not apply 
(see for example Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Further, bootstrapping has additional 
advantages as it takes into account both sampling errors in the propensity score estim
and errors due to multiple matches for a single treated unit. This is because each 
bootstrap repetition selects a sample (with replacement) from the sample of house
within the common support, and, in each replication, re-estimates the propensity score. 
  11IV.  DATA AND VARIABLES 
The data used in this study are derived from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) in 
993 (IFLS1), 1997 (IFLS2) and 2000 (IFLS3) by RAND in collaboration with several 
nally representative data set covering 13 out of 27 
itial conditions. This is because only a 





lth and health care need vary 









local universities. The IFLS is a natio
Indonesian provinces where 83% of the population resides. It is a very rich data source 
collected at the individual, household and community levels, and its reliability had been 
formally documented (Thomas et al., 2001). 
 
In this study, I focus on treated households in IFLS3 and use their characteristics in 
IFLS1 (Sample 1) and IFLS2 (Sample 2) as in
sm
IFLS3 obtained the concession after 1997. I drop a minority of households (2%) that
treated in both IFLS2 and IFLS3 to make IFLS2 a valid control sample. Also, only no
split households are included in the samples as conditions at the origin households may
be a poor representation of conditions after the separation.  
 
The units of study are both household and individual. For the individual-level analysis, I
focus on adults (age ≥15 years old), as young children’s hea
g
child gets older). Matching is performed at household-level because members of one 
household have the same treatment status, and individual characteristics, except those of 
the household heads, do not influence health card’s availability. The ATT is then 
calculated at the individual-level, with all members of one household having identical
propensity score of being treated. To incorporate individual-specific variables, 
individuals are categorised according to their relation to the household head in the
treatment year: the household heads, the spouse of the household heads, children of the
household head and a pool of other household members. It is important to keep 
that ‘children’ does not imply young age. Indeed, the average age of children is clo
22 years in the treatment year. Meanwhile, other household members include parents, in
laws, step children, grandparents, nieces/spouses, uncles/aunts and servants. This divisio
is chosen because household hierarchy may convey extra information about intra-
  12household information sharing and resource allocation; there is only 1 health card per 
household to cover all household members. Further, it may be a nifty way to group 
individuals based on common characteristics. For example, spouses tend to be 30–
years old females who are not working in the formal (taxed) labour market. The final 
samples consist of 5,262 households in Sample 1 and 4,580 households in Sample 2
 
Dependent variables 




0% of households in each sample are treated households. To measure health care 




are, averaging the two samples, about 80 percent of members in treated 






at public and private facilities. Public facilities include health centers and its subsidiaries
hospitals and village midwives. Meanwhile, private facilities are private hospitals a
physicians. Traditional practitioners (e.g., religious healers) are excluded. For inpatient 
care, the reference period is 12 months to the survey, and for outpatient care, this period 
is 4 weeks. Outpatient care are further categorised according to their purpose, namely 
curative-type and preventative-type services. From the list of purposes in the survey, 
visitation for “treatment” and “medication” only are classified as curative-type service 
where as for other purposes such as medical check-ups, vaccination and an assortment 
treatments are classified as preventative-type care. As suggested by equation (4), the 
dependent variables are the first-difference of each of these health care consumption 
measures.  
 
In the samples, the proportions of non-user of formal health care are very large. For 
outpatient c
h
health care. In comparison between health care utilisation by household members of 
treated and non-treated households, members of non-treated households consume sli
less public services, which is not unexpected as services at public facilities are typically
cheaper than those at private clinics, and more private services. This picture of low he
care utilisation confirms observations from Susenas data set (Lanjouw et al., 2000). 
Meanwhile, inpatient cases are very rare for both groups in both samples (1–3 percent). 
  13Beside the common agreement that hospitalisation is an unpleasant experience, this rarity 
may be explained by high opportunity cost of inpatient days, as compensation payments 
for sick days are not available for most workers.  
 
Table 1A and 1B present health care consumption pattern in the treatment year by 
household hierarchy for Sample 1 and 2 respectively. These are data a typical cross-













means for two samples are reported in parentheses. In general, as anticipated, on av
members of treated households (treated individuals) pay more visits to public faciliti
than members of non-treated households (non-treated individuals) to receive outpatie
care. Because the initial utilisation levels are considerably low, the magnitudes of the 
differences according to treatment status are quite marked. Based on this snap-shot thus
appears that the health card program has some success in achieving its objective.  
 
Treated household heads and spouses tend to use more public facilities and less of private 
facilities for outpatient care than non-treated heads and spouses. For spouses, this i
m
facilities more frequently than non-treated children to treat illness or obtain medication 
and this difference is significant in Sample 2. It is worth noting that the children sub-
samples are quite different for Sample 1 and 2. The children sample is much smalle
children are older in Sample 1 because many young adults in 2000 (i.e., the 15–21 year 
olds) are not in the 1993 (adult) survey – they answered children booklets in the IFLS
is tempting to track down these young adults’ health care consumption to the children 
booklet. However, this is not pursued because the assumption of constant evolution of 
time-invariant individual heterogeneity made by the empirical strategy may be too strong 
(see Section III). In particular, in seven years time, 8–14 years-olds are likely to engage
in different activities than schooling, and their immune system are likely to strengthen a
they grow up to adulthood. For other household members in different households, there is 
no significant difference in health care consumption, although in general the directions o
differences are consistent with those experienced by the core household members. Like 
the children samples, other members in Sample 1 and Sample 2 are quite different, and 
  14by comparing the age figures, it appears that non-core household members who remain in 
the house throughout the surveys tend to be elderly.  
 




















Outpatient care          
Public  0.141 0.172 0.201 0.225 0.069 0.130 0.166 0.210 
    (1.647)*    (0.872)  (1.128)   
Private  0.097 0.070 0.096 0.065 0.085 0.196 0.07
(0.746) 
6 0.056 
   (1.812)*   (1.831)*    (1.369)   (0.567) 
Curative - public  0.055 0.079 0.091 0.110 0.032 0.065 0.094 0.161 
    (2.032)**    (1.139)  (0.868)    (1.439) 
Curative - private  0.037 0.027 0.039 0.033 0.068 0.0434  0.034 0.008 
   (1.127)  (0.509)  (0.086)  (1.438) 
Preventative – public  0.086 0.092 0.110 0.114 0.037 0.065 0.072 0.048 
   (0.384)  (0.201)  (0.704)  (0.635) 
Preventative – private  0.060 0.043 0.057 0.031 0.037 0.152 0.043 0.048 
   (1.424)   (1.967)**   (1.862)  (0.185) 
Inpatient care           
Public  0.013 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.000 0.009 0.008 
    (0.253)    (0.384)  (0.700)  (0.097) 
Private  0.007 0.013 0.009 0.003 0.016 0.043 0.007 0.008 
   (1.696)*  (1.536)  (1.155)  (0.127) 
          
Average age (in 2000)  50.61 50.74 43.56 43.06 27.31 28.13 58.98 60.90 
N  3526 929 2769 726 188  46  445  124 
   
 


















Outpatient care              
Public  0.135 0.148 0.189  0.232 0.071 0.122 0.124  0.155 
   (0.751)    (1.761)*    (3.542)***   
Private  0.084 0.061 0.092  0.054 0.057 0.039 0
(1.114) 
.069  0.044 
   (1.770)*   (2.373)***    (1.524)    (1.291) 
Curative - public  0.055 0.061 0.087  0.113 0.031 0.065 0.069  0.087 
   (0.576)    (1.653)*    (3.349)***    (0.877) 
Curative - private  0.035 0.028 0.035  0.029 0.025 0.018 0.034  0.014 
   (0.922)   (0.573)  (0.923)   (1.521) 
Preventative - public  0.080 0.087 0.102  0.119 0.040 0.057 0.055  0.068 
   (0.480)   (0.919)  (1.625)   (0.690) 
Preventative - private  0.049 0.034 0.057  0.025 0.032 0.022 0.035  0.030 
   (1.567)  (2.539)***   (1.232)   (0.346) 
Inpatient care             
Public  0.012 0.012 0.012  0.020 0.010 0.011 0.015  0.005 
    (0.030)  (1.770)*  (0.320)   (1.340) 
Private  0.006 0.006 0.010  0.005 0.003 0.011 0.007  0.003 
   (0.200)   (1.177)  (0.356)   (0.914) 
              
Average age (in 2000)  48.50 48.89 41.69  41.51 22.01 21.47 38.46  40.05 
N  3642 933 3026  759 2079 464 1029  269 
Note: absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 
D=0 refers to n on -treated in dividuals an d D=1 refers to treated in dividuals. Figures are m ean s in  year 2000 in  each  sam ple. 
‘Child’ refers to son/ daughter of the household head who answered adult booklets (15 years or older) in both sample years.    
   
  15Lastly, with regard to inpatient care, the two samples provide different pictures. This may 
be explained by the very few hospitalisation cases in each year. Hence, although 
important, extra caution should be taken when dealing with inpatient care variables.  
 
Nonetheless, it is still to be determined whether these differences in health care utilisation 
pattern are due to the health card program. Before doing the formal evaluation, Table 2A 
and B report the simple DID estimates for Sample 1 and 2 respectively. It can be seen 
that double-differencing eliminates almost all the previously observed differences in 
health care consumption between treated and non-treated individuals. This suggests that 
treated individuals have already used more public facilities, which generally provides 
cheaper services, than private facilities even without health card holding. Analyses that 
miss pre-treatment information therefore may provide misleading conclusion.     
 
In Sample 1, it can be seen that there is almost no significant difference in health care 
ples (7 
t 
that the program has no effect. The picture is more 
consumption between treated and non-treated individuals. A possible explanation for this 
result is the relatively long time elapse between the control and the treatment sam
years), which allow individuals’ health conditions to change perhaps substantially. Bu
another reason could well be 
promising in Sample 2, which involves much shorter time gap between samples, with 
treated children having significantly higher consumption of public health care to treat 
illness than non-treated children. Most of the increase in health care consumption 
occurred after the treatment as there were no significant differences between children’s 
health care consumption pre-intervention. The table also shows that in general treated 








  16Table 2A:   DID of Health Care Consumption by Treatment Status (Sample 1) 
 Head    Spouse  Child  Other 
  DID |t-stat| DID |t-stat| DID |t-stat| DID |t-stat| 
Outpatient care          
Public  0.030 1.196  0.030 0.822  0.006 0.054  -0.065 0.897 
Private  -0.008 0.411  -0.003 0.126  0.044 0.447  -0.028 0.6511 
Curative - public  0.021 1.475  0.024 1.112  0.006 0.126  0.022 0.424 
Curative - private  0.010 0.905  0.002 0.141  -0.086 1.517  -0.027 1.358 
Preventative - public  0.005 0.236  0.004 0.130  -0.012 0.122  -0.098 1.652* 
Preventative -
Inpatient care
 private  0.002 0.132  -0.006 0.322  -0.049 0.944  -0.001 0.032 
           
Public  0.002 0.388  0.016 1.908*  0.016 0.560  -0.009 0.612 
Private  0.006 1.182  -0.004 0.570  0.044 1.279  0.000 0.000 
          
N  4455 3495 234  569 
   
able 2B:   DID of Health Care Consumption by Treatment Status (Sample 2) 
 
T
 Head    Spouse  Child  Other
  DID |t-stat| DID |t-stat| DID |t-stat| DID |t-stat| 
Outpatient care        
Public  -0.012 0.507  0.007 0.236  0.067 2.893***  0.072 1.612 
Private  -0.021 1.228  -0.024 1.169  -0.054 2.253**  -0.006 0.187 
Curative - public  -0.017 1.204  0.031 1.461  0.053 2.931***  0.051 1.504 
Curative - private  0.000 0.006  0.011 0.891  -0.006 0.380  -0.015 0.675 
Preventative - public  0.004 0.202  -0.015 0.551  0.023 1.126  0.020 0.591 
Preventative - private  -0.021 1.714*  -0.037 2.217**  -0.048 2.623***  0.008 0.302 
Inpatient care         
Public  0.000 0.005  0.010 1.486  0.003 0.439  -0.007 0.553 
Private  0.000 0.060  -0.001 0.170  0.003 0.391  -0.005 0.722 
           
N  4575 3787 2543 1298 
Note: *, ** and *** denotes 10, 5 and 1% significance level respectively.    
   
Explanatory variables  
Conditions that explain both eligibility and health care demand are relevant covariates. 
influenced by demographics, socioeconomic status, health care supply and environmental 
conditions. Fortunately, the IFLS data set is sufficiently rich to capture almost all of these 
variables.  
 
The first set of variables consists of measures of household’s welfare that determine both 
eligibility and health conditions. These variables include household compositions, value 
of asset, weekly expenditure, the proportion of household members who regard their 
Eligibility is determined by household’s welfare condition while health care demand is 
  17general health as unhealthy, residential status (renting or not), source of drinking water, 
flooring materials and ownership of at least one form of health insurance. In addition, I 
include household's head characteristics such as age, gender, dialect, education and 
employment. Head’s characteristics are observed by the program administrators, and so 
they influenced health card eligibility. For example, unemployment of the household 
head is listed as one of the eligibility criteria.  
 
The second set of variables measure the extent of household’s knowledge on health care 
facilities. Knowledge is important because it reflects the accessibility of a certain type of 
health facility and consideration to receive treatment at this facility. Furtherm s 
ain way social relationships influence health care demand is 
 
rs 
ith social network – which is hard to quantify – by including health 




nown in the literature that supply 
fluences demand through induced-demand or by altering people’s behaviour towards 
s 
ore, it ha
been suggested that the m
through their effect on health knowledge (Andersen, 1995). Social networks disseminate
references and updates on new products, and help locate appropriate health care provide
(Weerdt and Dercon, 2006). As such, households with strong social network tend to be 
knowledgeable. This link suggests that we may reduce omitted variable problem 
associated w
k
whereabouts of public hospitals, private hospitals, health centers, private practices, nurses 
or midwives and traditional practitioners that the family could go to. They respond on 
behalf of the entire household as the knowledge questions were not forwarded to othe
household members. 
 
The final set of control variables deal with variations in the quantity and quality of h
care providers. The availability of community-level data and facility surveys in the IFLS
makes this study one of the few demand-side analyses that can jointly account for 
variations in the supply-side factors. It is well-k
in
illness. Information about the quantity of health facilities are obtained from the 
community data, while quality variables are obtained from the facility survey. To 
measure quality, I consider the availability of full-time health workers (e.g., GPs, dentist
and nurses), birth services, laboratories and check-up equipment in facilities in the 
  18community. Furthermore, both demand and supply of health care may be affected by 
exogenous health shocks to the community. To control for this, two indicator variables 
for minor and major health shocks in the last three years are created. A minor (major) 
health shock refers to any health-related epidemics such as outbreak of diseases o
which affected less than (at least) 50% of the local population. In Sample 1, 31 ou
IFLS communities (10 percent) experienced at least one major shock in the past 3 years 
and 132 communities (49 percent) experienced at least one minor shock in the same 
period. In Sample 2, the corresponding numbers are 41 (13 percent) and 100 (32 percen
communities.         
 
r flood 
t of 312 
t) 
 addition to these covariates, a dummy variable for urban area and 12 provincial 
 





er observation however is somewhat disappointing as it suggests that 
donesian’s health knowledge has not improved over time. On the other hand, housing 
conditions were better in 1997. Meanwhile, comparing between treated and non-treated 
In
dummy variables are included to control for regional heterogeneity. This is essential 
because Indonesia's population is very unevenly distributed. About 70% of the population
lives in Java Island which has a land area of only 7% of the country's total dry land
result, development stages vary substantially across regions, and health resources 
unevenly distributed (Lanjouw et al., 2000). Regional differences also carry exogenous 
variations such as differences in staple food, soil fertility and rainfall activity, wh
affect local health conditions. Finally, sampling weights are used that take into acc
attrition in the survey (IFLS). 
 
Table 3 reports selected summary statistics by treatment status. The full summary 
statistics are provided in Appendix A. All variables are characteristics as at pre-treatment 
period to ensure satisfaction of the exogeneity assumption (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2005). Comparison between the two base years reveals high similarity between the two 
base samples. This is expected because most the IFLS3 households have complete 
information in the earlier two waves. Both years provide similar household head’s 
characteristics, household compositions, initial level of health status with about 1 in 1
household members reported themselves generally unhealthy, and similar levels of health 
knowledge. The latt
In
  19households, the table reveals that treated households tend to be headed by lowly ed
heads, consist of more elderly members and fewer working-age adult members, have 
lower value of asset and expenditure, are less likely to have health insurance and live in 
relatively sub-standard quality houses with non-tile flooring and limited access to direct 
piped water for drinking and cooking. Treated households also tend not to be renters 
which may indicate long-term residents. Hence, although accompanied with considerabl
variations, average figures hint that the program have successfully reached its target. 
Using 1998 Susenas data set and benefit-incidence analysis, Lanjouw et al. (2000) 
support this conjecture that the
ucated 
e 
 poor does benefit from subsidised primary health care.  
 
Table 3:  Selected descriptive statistics 
  Sample 1  Sample 2 
 Non-treated    Treated  Non-treated  Treated
  Mean   Std. Dev.  Mean   Std. Dev.  Mean   Std. Dev.  Mean   Std
 
. Dev.
Household  head's  Characteristics          
Male  0.85 0.36 0.85 0.36 0.84 0.36 0.83  0.38 
Primary school  0.50 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.61 
Junior high school  0.13 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.10 
Senior high school  0.15 0.35 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.11 
College / higher  0.05 0.22 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.02  0.13 
Household's  Characteristics          
# under 6 years  0.59 0.77 0.61 0.77 0.49 0.72 0.52  0.70 
# 6 – 14 years olds   1.05 1.12 1.00 1.10 1.05 1.08 1.04  1.05 
# 15 - 49 years olds  2.46 1.44 2.22 1.29 2.94 1.73 2.70  1.57 
# elderly (50+ years)  0.63 0.80 0.65 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.87  0.91 
Not renting  0.80 0.40 0.84 0.37 0.85 0.36 0.88  0.32 









N  4,588  1,037  3,689   891   
Ceramic floor  0.26 0.44 0.17 0.38 0.30 0.46 0.21  0.41 
Cement floor  0.38 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.37  0.48 
Bamboo floor  0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.14  0.3
Insurance  0.19 0.39 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.40 0.13  0.3
% unhealthy  0.12 0.27 0.12 0.27 0.12 0.24 0.13  0.25 
Log Asset  14.83 1.89 14.41 1.76 15.60 1.68 15.18  1.59 
Log expenditure  10.73 1.21 10.43 1.14 10.94 0.96 10.76  0.85 
Knowledge (spouse)         
Public hospital  0.68 0.47 0.62 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.57  0.50 
Private hospital  0.37 0.48 0.29 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.29  0.45 
Health centers  0.91 0.28 0.94 0.24 0.90 0.30 0.94  0.23 
Private doctor  0.54 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.36  0.48 
Midwife  0.66 0.47 0.66 0.48 0.77 0.42 0.78 
Traditional healer  0.63 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.78 
           
   
  20V. RESULT   
As discussed in Section III, to obtain unbiased estimates of the ATT, attention must be 
restricted to samples within the region of common support. In this case, imposing this 
condition only requires exclusion of a small number of households (less than 3 percent in 
both samples). This is encouraging as with large number of households within the 
common support, it is likely that the estimated ATTs are free of bias due to observables. 
Both samples readily pass the balancing tests as described by Becker and Ichino (2002) 
which ensures that the observed characteristics of matched-pairs are comparable.   
 
Figure 1 and 2:  PSM in full sample 
 
  Note: the left-side graph is for Sample 1 and the right-side is for Sample 2. The kernel density 
of the estimated propensity scores is calculated assuming Gaussian weight. 
 





specially since the health card program is targeted to the poor.   
The quality of match is 
featured considerable overlapped regions, especially for Sample 2, suggesting that for 
many treated households there are many non-treated households with the same realisati
of propensity score. They however are not perfect mapping. In fact, matching technique 
requires that every household constitutes a possible health card holder; the common
support condition fails if households with certain characteristic are either always or never
receive treatment (P( i X ) =0 or P( i X ) =1). So, the finding that no household in either 
sample has 0 or 1 realisation of its propensity score is actually encouraging in this s
e
 
  21Nonetheless, statistical significance of covariates in the matching equation means that 
households with health card have different characteristics than those without health card. 
Consequently, simple comparison between average outcomes of the treated and non-
treated individuals (Tables 1A–2B) is unlikely to yield the true causal effects of health 
card availability. In general, it is found that health card holding is significantly more 
likely for households with inferior housing conditions, and have few assets and low 
income. The coefficients of household composition variables and household head’s 
characteristics have the expected signs but are not significant. Rubin and Thomas (1996) 
however advise not to remove insignificant variables from the matching equation unless 
riables, the likelihood 
f health card holding increases with knowledge about the locations of public health 
 
les 
ffect one household’s 
elfare state, which in turn determines its eligibility for health card. With regards to the 
 
st 
there is a strong reason to do so. With regard to the knowledge va
o
centres and decreases with knowledge of private hospitals. This result may be explained 
by the tendency of private hospitals to be located in better-off neighbourhoods – with a
few poor households – where there is demand for them.   
 
Meanwhile, the relationship between household’s health card status and supply variab
is less clear. This makes sense because the inclusion of supply variables as covariates in 
the matching equation is justified on the basis that they influence health care utilisation, 
rather than because they influence one household’s eligibility for a health card. It seems 
unreasonable to expect that changes in supply variables directly a
w
quantity of public health facilities in the community, the finding of lacking statistical 
insignificance is also consistent with the commitment of the primary health system in the 
country to provide at least one form of public provider within a defined distance or to
arrange regular visitation by medical professionals if physical form of facility is not 
available. For the quality variables, in both samples, households with health card are 
more likely to reside in areas where birth services were initially limited, which is 
consistent with incidences of the family planning program in the late 1990s, but almo
all of the health personnel variables are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the 
direction of the coefficients of most personnel variables is negative. Unlike the supply-
expansion part of the family planning program though, to my knowledge, there is no 
  22similar expansion in health personnel in the country. While, negative coefficients sug
that many treated households reside in areas with limited health personnel in the pre-
intervention year. Thus, if excess capacity is unlikely, restricted supply conditions may 
inhibit the induced demand (due to health card availability
gest 
) to be realised. This issue 












Compared to all samples, control households in the matched samples have relatively low 
income, more knowledge about public facilities and traditional healers and less 
knowledge about private facilities, indicating increased compatibility with treated 
households. Unlike in the case of matching by covariate however, the PSM method does
not generally yield identical means of covariates for matched pairs because the propensity
score is a summary measure that takes into account influences from all variables in the
matching equation on the health card holding status. The PSM method instead places a 
larger emphasis on balancing covariates that are the key predictors of the treatment stat
as found in the logit regression. 
 
Table 4A and 4B reports the ATT estimates for different household members in Sa
and 2, respectively. These are the main results. Differences between estimates in these 
tables with those in Table 2A–B reflect the confounding effects of observed covariate
health care consumption pattern. In general, the conditional estimates in Table 4A–B ar
smaller in absolute magnitude than the unconditional estimates in Table 2A–B sugges
that the overall effect of observables on the treatment status is positive. This direction is 









  23Table 4A:   ATT Estimates by Household Hierarchy (Sample 1)  


























Outpatient care                  
Public  -0.010 0.029  0.039  -0.035 -0.011  0.025  -0.030 -0.023  0.007  -0.046 -0.107  -0.061 
    (0.027)      (0.042)     (0.124)    (0.090) 
Private  0.024  0.015 -0.009 
    (0.019) 
0.019  0.003 -0.016  -0.004  0.070 0.073  0.014  0.000 -0.014 
    (0.020)     (0.161)    (0.047) 
Curative - public  0.018  0.037 0.019  0.036  0.045 0.009  0.011  0.023 0.012  0.067  0.054 -0.013 
    (0.017)      (0.024)     (0.070)    (0.078) 
2 
9) 
Curative - private  0.018 0.005  -0.013 0.022  0.015  -0.006  0.036 -0.047  -0.082 0.025 0.000  -0.025 
    (0.010)      (0.012)     (0.064)    (0.016) 
Preventative - public  -0.026  -0.011  0.015  -0.067 -0.054  0.013  -0.041 -0.047  -0.005 -0.098  -0.161  -0.06
    (0.025)      (0.033)     (0.107)    (0.08
Preventative - 
private  0.006  0.011 0.005  -0.002  -0.012 -0.010  -0.039  0.116 0.156  -0.012  0.000 0.012 
    (0.017)      (0.017)     (0.142)    (0.052) 
Inpatient care                   
Public  0.003  0.004 0.000  -0.010  0.003 0.013  -0.006  0.000 0.006  -0.014 -0.018 -0.004 
    (0.006)      (0.009)     (0.009)     (0.021) 
Private  -0.001  0.007 0.008  -0.003  -0.009 -0.006  -0.008  0.047 0.054  0.009  0.000 -0.009 
    (0.006)      (0.005)     (0.039)    (0.019) 
                 




able 4B:   ATT Estimates by Household Hierarchy (Sample 2)  T


























Outpatient care                    
Public  -0.008  -0.008  0.000  0.009  0.022 0.013  0.023  0.066 0.044  0.027  0.055 0.028 
     (0.020)     (0.040)    (0.021)**    (0.045
Private  0.014  0.006  -0.008 0.019  -0.020 -0.039  0.016  -0.010 -0.027  0.027  -0.004 -0.031 
     (0.016)     (0.021)*    (0.017)    (0.025
Curative - public  0.008  -0.001  -0.010 0.017  0.053 0.036  0.011  0.044 0.033  0.024  0.063 0.039 
     (0.020)     (0.026)    (0.016)**    (0.038
Curative - private  0.004  0.000  -0.004 0.008  0.011 0.003  0.008  0.006 -0.002  0.017  0.000 -0.017 





blic 0  0.003  -0.008  -0.011 
14)    (0.031) 
Preventative - private  0.011  0.006  -0.005 0.012  -0.031 -0.043  0.009  -0.016 -0.025  0.010  -0.004 -0.014 
     (0.014)     (0.017)***    (0.015)    (0.020) 
Inpatient care                     
Public  0.001  0.000  -0.001 -0.003 0.006 0.009  0.002  0.007 0.005  0.005  -0.004 -0.009 
     (0.006)     (0.008)    (0.005)     (0.011) 
Private  0.002  -0.001  -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001  0.006  0.006 0.000  -0.002  -0.004 -0.002 
     (0.005)     (0.004)    (0.000)    (0.010) 
                   
N  3044  790    2442  638   2876  680   981  254  
Note: (s.e.)B denotes bootstrapped standard error with 200 replications. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
respectively. C refers to control units and D is treated units. ATT are estimated for matched treated individuals in the region of common support. 
Preventative - pu   -0.014 -0.006  0.008  -0.008  -0.022  -0.014  0.012 0.022  0.01
     (0.023)     (0.032)    (0.0
   
 
For outpatient care, in Sample 1, none of the ATTs are statistically significant at any 
conventional significance levels. For household heads and spouses, the direction of the 
  24treatment effects for all types of care at public facilities though is positive. For children 
and other household members, some of the estimates have unexpected sign, but they may 
be unreliable due to small sample sizes. Zhao (2004), using Monte Carlo experiment, 
finds that the PSM method does not perform well in small sample, which is set at 500 in 
the study, compared to other method of matching (e.g., covariate matching) as the 
variance of the estimated treatment effect is too large. In this case, the sizes of both the 
children and other member samples in Sample 1 are less than 500 observations.   
 
In Sample 2, the results persistently find that health card availability has no significant 
effect on treated heads’ health care consumption. The ATT for every type of health care 
is very small. On the other hand, health card significantly lowers treated spouses’ 
visitations to private providers to receive preventative-type treatments. Further 
vestigation reveals that this result is largely driven by the spouses’ demand for 
 large expansion of 
contraceptive services in public facilities, which is part of the national family planning 
program in the late 1990s, that can be covered by health card. The consumption of 
preventative-type care at public facilities however is stable on average. A possible 
explanation for this is the much fewer occurrences of spouses’ visits to private clinics 
compared to visits to public facilities (Table 1A–B). Given so, their visitations to private 
providers tend to be for a specific cause(s), such as to obtain contraception, while they 
visit public health providers for other services too. I will explore the effect of health card 
on contraceptive take-up next. On the other hand, treated spouses’ visitations to public 
providers for curative-type treatments are higher after health card holding and this result 
is statistically significant for a positive alternative.  
 
Health card availability especially benefited the son/daughters of the household head. In 
particular, it allows the children to pay more frequent visits to public health facilities to 




contraception. As have been mentioned previously, there had been a
c
magnitude of the ATT is actually quite substantial when compared to the mean level p
intervention; the availability of health card increases treated children’s health care 
consumption by more than 80 percent. Their consumption of preventative-type treatmen
  25at public facilities also increases but is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, health 
card availability is associated with fewer visitations to private providers, but to a small
magnitude than the overall increase in consumption of public health care, and it is not 
statistically significant for a causal relationship. For other household members, con











ere is only one eligible female in the 
ousehold who is the spouse of the household head. There are about 3,799 eligible 
 
Meanwhile, Sample 1 and 2 provide consistent results with regard to inpatient care: in n
case health card availability increases treated members’ consumption of inpatient care. 
This is not unexpected given that inpatient treatment is a rarity for Indonesian 
households. 
 
Contraceptive enrolment  
The effect of health card on fertility decisions is also important as health card can cover
both maternal care and contraceptive treatments; the former encourages a larger fam
size while the latter delays or prevents pregnancy. There are however reasons to bel
that the effect of health card on encouraging larger family is small. These include 
uncertainty in continuous availability of health card and intensifying government’s family
planning campaign (which encourage 2 children per family). To investigate this matter,
consider contraceptive take-up during the study period and future plan to use 
contraceptive device for females who do not use contraception in the treatment year. In 
the IFLS, contraceptive booklets are forwarded to all females aged 15–54 year olds 
(eligible females). For the majority of households, th
h
females in Sample 1 and 3,518 females in Sample 2. Table 5 reports the ATT estimates 






  26Table 5:  ATT estimates on contraceptive take-up 














          
Enrollment at public facilities   0.141 0.208  0.067 0.104  0.137  0.033 
     (0.016)***     (0.015)** 
Plan to use (if not using)  0.145 0.128  -0.017 0.141  0.142  0.002 
     (0.012)     (0.020) 
           




r the (D) columns reveal the average proportions of new contraceptive 
nrolments by treated eligible females in matched households within 7 and 3 years time 






de towards contraception among eligible females who, for various reasons 
.g., religious), choose not to use contraception.  
obustness Check  
his section concerns with sensitivity of the results to assumptions made in producing 
lead to biased results.  
e
for Sample 1 and 2 respect
eligible females in the matched non-treated households. The mean for Sample 2 is lower 
due to enrolments prior to 1997.  
 
The results are not surprising given the reinforcement to enroll is heightened by su
expansion in public facilities mentioned earlier. The ATT estimates suggest that treated 
eligible females take advantage of both health card coverage and the supply expansion to 
start using contraception. This result is consistent with Jensen (1996) which fi
Indonesian women’s contraceptive behaviour is highly sensitive to the presence of 
subsidised facilities. Results from the RAND HIE have also suggested that preventat
type services are particularly price-sensitive due to reasons such as preventative-care as a 
luxury good as opposed to a normal good, and its high substitutability. Note though
enrollment does not guarantee continuity of use; females may fail to meet their next 






them. The following explore several problems that may 
  27First, treatment effects may be heterogeneous and classification by household hierarchy 
does not sufficiently capture individual heterogeneity. For example, the age range for 
household heads is a wide 80 years. Other ways to slice the data hence is considered: by 
age group and by gender. The ATTs are re-calculated, and overall the results by age 
groups reflect the previous results with positive effects found among the younger cohorts 
– who are likely to be in the children sample in the earlier division by household 
hierarchy –, and negative effects on preventative care at private facilities for 30-49 years-






estriction is made on the treated 
ouseholds because health card can be used at any public health facilities in the country. 
tion eliminates exclusive neighbourhoods consisting of only rich 
ins of 
about 72 percent and 77 percent of all households in Sample 1 and Sample 2, 
also calculated, and the results for males and females closely reflect the results for he
and spouses. One may also be tempted to slice the data by education levels, hypothesisin
that educated individuals have different health care consumption pattern than less 
educated individuals, but the sample sizes of the treated group for the higher education 
level sample get very small.   
 
Second, the estimated ATTs may be confounded by the effect of relevant macroeconom
changes. So far, it is assumed that macroeconomic effects are homogenous across units –
and so they are differenced away. The implication of this assumption is that all non-
treated households are a potential comparison group. Nevertheless, it is often the case 
that macroeconomic movements affect different groups of the population differently
way to investigate this possibility is to restrict the comparison group to households that 
share more similar characteristics with the treated households. Income level is commonly 
used to guide this division. However, in the face of substantial regional heterogeneity, 
this separation is complex (see Lanjouw et al., 2000; Booth, 1993 for discussion).  
 
An alternative way may be to restrict the comparison group to households who reside in 
communities that issued a health card in 2000; no r
h
In effect, this restric
households. Arguably, macroeconomic changes affect households in these communities 
more uniformly (compared to all sample). The resulting restricted sample conta
  28respectively. The propensity scores are recalculated, and households are re-matched. The
matching results are summarised in Figure 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 3 and 4:  PSM in restricted sample 
 
 
  Note: the left-side graph is for Sample 1 and the right-side is for Sample 2. The kernel density 
f the estimated propensity scores is calculated assuming Gaussian weight. 
fects the rich. This is consistent with the finding that income elasticity of health care is 
ited 
distribution between treated and non-treated households. It however assumes that bias 
o
 
Similar to the previous matching results, there are considerable overlapped regions. But 
in these samples, the upper bounds of the estimated propensity score is closer to one 
compared to those obtained from the unrestricted samples. There are also fewer matched 
households with propensity score less than 0.2 in these samples than there are in the 
unrestricted samples. All of these results may reflect improved compatibility of matched 
pairs. In general, the estimated health card effects are larger in these samples as the 
means for the new control samples are smaller. This trend may suggest that 
macroeconomic crisis affects health care consumption pattern of the poor more than it 
af
larger for poorer households than it is for poorer households (IRMS). However, the main 
thrust of the previous results is maintained that the health card program only have lim
effects on health care consumption of its beneficiaries.  
 
The last test but perhaps the most important of all is with regard to the first fundamental 
assumption in the PSM method that there is no selection on unobservables. Matching and 
the balancing tests adjust for biases due to non-overlapping support and differences in the 
  29from the third source, that is, selection on unobservables, is zero. The above results 
therefore may be changed by factors that are not in the data. This possibility is rarely 
hecked by researchers. Recently, Becker and Caliendo (2007) suggest an indirect check 
e the effect of the unobservables or 
“hidden bias” needs to be in order to reverse the results found by the PSM method. The 
test is based on non-parametric Mantel and Haenszel (MH) test statistic (1959) for binary 
outcomes with the null hypothesis that, given random sampling, the outcome variables 
are not affected by treatment status – otherwise, the outcomes may be positively or 
negatively affected by the treatment and the estimated treatment effect is said to be 
significant if the test statistic crosses a given critical value. As demonstrated in Aakvik 
(2001), the test involves comparing the number of treated individuals who are affected by 
the treatment and its expected number if the treatment has no effect. When the outcome 
  
c
for this condition by asking the question how larg
variables are not binary in nature, Becker and Caliendo (2005) suggest transforming the 
variables so that an intended outcome is coded 1 and 0 otherwise.
 
To provide some underlying behind the test, consider a matched pair i and j, and let  i P  
and  j P  be the probability that each individual receives treatment. The odds ratio that 





























,    (6) 
which becomes  )] ( exp[ j i u u − γ  if a matched pair has comparable observable
In other words, theoretically, matched-pairs differ only by a factor 
 covariates. 
γ  and their 
unobservables u. The ignorability assumption requires that either  0 = γ  or  0 ) ( = − j i u u . 
An important result from Rosenbaum (2002) is that suppose the null hypothesis is false, 
the odds ratio that one of the matched pair receives treatment can be bounded by the 
following bounds: 
) exp(
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,    (8) 
where 
D
s Y1  ) / ( 1 s s Ds N Y N =  is the number of positive outcome for the treated sample (i
the number of treated individuals who use more health care post-treatment than they do 
pre-treatment) in stratum s of the sample,  s Cs Ds N N N
.e., 




s Y Y Y 1 1 1 = + , where  s Y1  
is the total number of positive outcome in stratum s. Under the null hypothesis, there is 
no treatment effect and positive outcome is equally likely for treated and non-treated
units. In this case, the strata are given by the estimated propensity score (Aavik, 200
 
Let  ) exp(
 
1). 
γ = Γ . Rosenbaum (2002) shows that for a given Γ and  } 1 , 0 { ∈ u , the MH test 
statistic is bounded by two known distributions, which move apart from each other 
reflecting increased uncertainty about the test statistics in the presence of hidden bias. If 
1 = Γ , there is no hidden bias, and i and j have the same probability of being treated. The 
hidden bias. The details about the MH test statistic and its bounds can be found in Aakvik 
 
d their respectiv , the upper 
bounds adjust the MH test statistics downwards when the ATTs a
the lower bounds adjust them upwards when the ATTs are underestimated.  
g d 
by observables, which we have explored so far and found to be in a positive direction. 
l 
ed 
ect. Here, given that most of the ATTs at public facilities have 
positive sign, which indicate benefit from health card avail
somewhat less concerning than overestimation. In other words, if individuals with low 
nd even more significant than what have been estimated – and this is not 
size of Γ hence reflects the extent matching results depart from the assumption of no 
(2001) and Becker and Caliendo (2005), which also offers a routine that calculates the
upper and lower bounds an e probability values. For a given Γ
re overestimated and 
In the case of the health card program, the direction of the hidden bias is not obvious. In 
the PSM-DID method, the hidden bias must come from time-varyin  unobserve
heterogeneity. Note that selection on unobservables must not be confused with selection 
The former needs not follow the same pattern as the latter. Indeed, if there is a substantia
selection by unobservables in the opposite direction, the true effect may be the revers
of the estimated eff
ability, underestimation is 
value of unobservables are overrepresented in the treatment samples, the true effects will 
be larger a
  31undesirable. We hence shall focus on the upper bounds which assume the estimated 
ATTs overestimate the true treatment effects. The test is perfo
specifying   at 0.05 interval from 1 to 2 (double the odds of being treated).   is 
rably large given th
 
s matching with radius 0.01 (simila
on
 
rmed for each sub-sample, 
Γ 2 = Γ
conside at the matching equation has included extensive background 
covariates. The outcome variables are transformed to binary variables (from count data),
and the weighting functions are given radiu r to the 
e used to produce results in Table 9); this test may be unsuitable for kernel matching 
which uses the entire sample (within the common support) as the matching pair (Becker
and Caliendo, 2005).   
 
The results from the tests suggest that already at small levels of Γ, health card 
availability no longer has significant effect on spouses and children in treated households 
(Sample 2). Under  1 = Γ , the MH test statistic suggests significant treatment effects for 
1 . 1 = Γ , the ATT for curative treatment at public facilities is 
alue for the upper bounds is 0.136). This 
means that the positive results might be reversed if spouses in treated and non-treated 
households are allowed to differ by just 10 percent in terms of unobserved characteristics. 
Meanwhile, the positive effect on treated children is more robust to influence from 
unobservables with  3 . 1 = Γ  before the confidence interval of this effect includes 0. It is 
noteworthy though that  1 . 1 = Γ  or  3 . 1
spouses. But with a value of 
no longer significant at 10 percent level (p-v
= Γ  does not imply that unobserved heterogeneity 
exists and that there is no positive effect from health card availability. This test is not 
designed to directly justify or invalidate the ignorability assumption. Rather, it suggests 
extra caution must be taken when concluding positive effect of health card, because the 
confidence interval for this effect would include 0 if unobservables cause the odds ratio 
of treatment status to differ between the treatment and the control groups by small 
magnitudes.   
 
In other cases where the treatment effects at  1 = Γ  are insignificant, the bounds inform
us the degree of hidden bias, positive and negative, the ATTs would become significant. 
Assuming 5 percent significance level, for household heads, the conclusion that health 
card has no effect on health care consumption in general is robust to a hidden bias that 
s 
  32would increases Γ to 1.1 in Sample 1 and 1.4–1.55 in Sample 2. Meanwhile, for othe
members, the conclusion of no effect is robust to a hidden bias that would increase the 
odds of receiving treatment up to 1.8 (Sample 2). In short, these checks sugge at it 
highly unlikely that the result of no positive effect is reversed.   
 
Overall, the results are pointing to the same direction, independent of the chosen 
comparison group or estimation technique: there is lacking evidence of positive impact o
the health card program.  
 
r 














Reconciling these results with prior expectation and evidences from developed c
the limited effect of health card is counterintuitive; by design, health card offers generous 
subsidy to those who were formerly restricted in access to formal health care. For 
instance, many public program eveloped countries, especially generous ones, are 
equipped with mechanism that discourages excessive usage or other rent-seeking 
behaviours (Manning et al., 1987; Riphan et al., 2003 provide contrasting evidence fro
developed countries). However, there are several explanations that may rationalise this 
result.  
 
First, Poterba (1994) arg t go ent intervention through price subsidy is ill-
suited when the price elasticity of demand for the subsidised good is low, or when ther
is large uncertainty and divergence in this elasticity across units. From Indonesia’s own 
health experiment study (the IRMS), Gertler (1995 in Lanjouw et al., 2000) finds that the
demand for health services in general at Indonesian public health facilities fit this 
condition; it is inelastic and varies greatly with income. Standard economic demand
supply theory p edi
nd schedule is inelastic.    d
 
Second, a relatively stable health care consumption may be due to the fact that 
households are not selected exclusively on the basis of their health conditions; healthy 
individuals – by his/her own standard – need very little medical care in a given period o
  33time. Meanwhile, health card availability does not mandate (higher) health care 
consumption; like other households, households with health card can choose whether or
not to seek medical treatment, from whom they wish to receive medical treatment, and 
the level of treatments to be consumed. Of course, increased visi
 
tations to health facilities 
re not necessarily a good outcome. However, the serious problem of underutilisation of 
 poor 
similar condition do. Consequently, this so-called adaptation 
ias sets the tolerance level for sickness before concluding a need for medical care higher 




erstand that health card can be used in the event of illness but are uncertain about 




he third explanation relates to the adequacy of the public health system. It has been 
g 
a
health care particularly by the poor is well-known. It is commonly argued that the
have adapted to certain adverse health conditions that they do not consider themselves 




A related issue is the variation in the extent of information given out by the village heads 
when distributing health cards. Because of the decentralised nature of the health ca
program (and the absence of official public information such as brochures explaining t
program at least in the first few years of the program), households may receive dif
levels of information about the objective of the program and the functioning of health 
card, such as with regard to the scope of coverage. For instance, recipient households 
may und
it
procedures. There is in fact a body of literature arguing that recipient households are 
unlikely to misuse public sympathy (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Fehr and Gachter, 2000;
Besley et al., 1993). These studies argue that the fear of social sanctions, such as isolation
and shame, discourages recipient households from economising health card availability. 
The credibility of this theory has been highly praised in developing countries wher
is great physical proximity between neighbours and households tend to be long-term and 
less mobile residents.  
 
T
widely recognised that public health facilities are often inadequate in developin
countries. A survey study by Filmer et al. (2000) for instance note the possibility of 
subsidised patients choosing full-price providers if they are of higher quality. Given that 
  34the IFLS data contains data on the supply side, future research should examine th
conditions available to different households.  
 
To sum up, limitedness of the effect of a public program is not a new result in the 
developing countries’ context. In the case of the health card program, this result is 
somewhat expected as the demand schedule for general health care in public facilities is
not price-sensitive to begin with. In addition, the demand incentive created by the 
program may also be counteracted by other costs associated with the subsidised care suc
as time costs and limited supply conditions. For the government, this finding has 




 allocation and designs for 




ies in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, health care utilisation by 
ousehold heads and other household members are unaffected by the presence of health 
l 
fu
in the short-run, the priority should be on expanding the public health system.       
 
VI.   CONCLUSION  
It has been suggested that poor households have low health because they lack access to 
adequate health care. The intention of the 1994 health card program has been to protec
the health status of Indonesian poor by allowing them access to adequate health care. B
design, the program is fairly generous providing full coverage for a wide range of 
primary health care services at public health facilities and allowing for unlimited claim
However, the findings in this thesis show that in general recipient households do not 
exploit the presence of health card and increase health care utilisation. There is some 
indication that younger members in the household made more visits to treat illness, but 
this result is not robust. There is also evidence that health card availability encourages 
contraceptive take-up by eligible females in the recipient households, but in this case, the 
demand reinforcement was paralleled with the expansion of family planning services in 
the public health facilit
h
card.   
 
In coming to this conclusion, PSM-DID estimator is applied on two large longitudina
samples with different base year. This estimator has not been extensively used in the 
  35health literature, but has been shown to be powerful in providing causal estimates in 
labour applications. More specifically, important advantages of the matching technique 






bserved characteristics suggests that the assumption about selection on observables may 





, the results provide yet another reason that results from developed countries might 




involvement of an explicit test to ensure that the estimated program effects are sup
by the data, and the combination between PSM and DID techniques eliminates the e
of time-specific heterogeneity and common macroeconomic effects. Further, matching 
technique is particularly suited for the current setting for the following two reasons
the richness of the data set allows matching technique to deal with selection biases due to 
observables considerably well. The availability of data on health care providers ad
credit to this study, as it manages to jointly account for variations in demand and supply
factors faced by different households that are often neglected in demand-sided studies. 
Second, the feature of the health card program that determines eligibility based on 
o
be mo
selection equation model.  
 
This study has several important implications. First, the health card program, in spite of 
its well intention, is not well designed. Although more studies are needed to sugges
suitable program design, there are suggestions that households may be more responsive 
to incentives in specific health care services as opposed to a general coverage or to 
programs that are targeted to individuals as opposed to households. Second, limitedne
of the effect of the health card program highlights the role of other factors in influencing
the performance of the program. A major problem in developing countries is inadequate
supply of health care. Policymakers should ensure that there is no mismatch between 
demand and supply in the sense that the program attempts to expand demand in areas 




hazard behaviour associated with generous programs is a common concern in develope
countries. In contrast, in developing countries, the cost of risky behaviour or reduced 
  36is increasingly high in the absence of compensation payments and insurance. The resu
find no evidence of household members in recipient households reducing their 
consumption of preventative-type health care, as predicted by the moral hazard theory, as
health card becomes available. In addition, in developing countries the role of informal 
health care, such as traditional healers and home-grown remedies is prevalent, and 
households consider them as acceptable substitutes for formal health care. In most cases
they are cheap and highly accessible. Future design for program aiming to encourage use 
of formal health care therefore may be accompanied with educational material to alter 
preferences. Implementing public programs may be more challenging for government
developing countries in the face of constrained resources, lack of knowledge and market 
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Results for the matching equation   
 
 
  Sample 1  Sample 2 
  Coeff. |t-stat|  Coeff. |t-stat| 
Household head's Characteristics    
Age  -0.005 1.25  -0.007 1.53 
Male 0.141  1.22  -0.045  0.38 
ary    Prim 0.126 1.18  0.197 1.71* 
-0.044 0.33 
years old   0.052  0.76  0.113  1.80* 
-0.407 3.86*** -0.296 2.51** 
boo  floor  -0.180 1.20  -0.355 2.02** 
0.64 
hospital  -0.083  0.94  0.047  0.49 
0.174  1.97**  -0.045  0.46 
Know  midwife  0.101 1.22  0.083 0.82 
Know traditional healer  -0.037 0.44  0.219 2.09** 
Junior school  -0.118  0.73  0.225  1.28 
Senior  school  -0.218 1.28  -0.148 0.76 
College/  higher  -0.444 1.68  -0.224 0.70 
Working  -0.085 0.76 
Muslim  0.043 0.25  0.346 2.01** 
# acute problem  0.011  0.39  0.001  0.07 
tics       Household's Characteris
# < 6 years old  0.058  1.13  0.099  1.7* 
# 6 -14 years old  0.036  1.00  0.065  1.60 
# 15 - 49 years old  0.009  0.29  -0.002  0.07 
# > 49 
Speak  Dialects  0.078 0.87  0.042 0.45 
House  self-owned  0.141 1.21  0.310 2.27** 
Piped  water  -0.347 2.7***  -0.247 2.19** 
Ceramic  floor  -0.549 4.19*** -0.571 4.19*** 
Cement  floor 
Bam
Health cover  0.103  0.88  -0.179  1.45 
Average  unhealthy  0.099 0.66  0.114 
Log  asset  -0.073 2.99*** -0.131 4.29*** 
Log expenditure  -0.084  2.29**  0.010  0.16 
Knowledge       
Know public 
Know private hospital  -0.201  2.06**  -0.134  1.27 
Know health centers  0.312  2.05**  0.562  3.44*** 
Know private doctor 
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  Coeff. |t-stat|  Coeff. |t-stat| 
     Supply   
Average full-time doctor  -0.214  1.77*  0.116  1.06 
Average full-time dentist  0.258  2.14**  -0.131  1.23 
verage full-time nurse  -0.0   -0.0 *** 
verage full-time midwives 
034  1.51  0.055  .70* 
ratories 
   
** 
** 
**  ** 
t care  ** 
inor surgery 
check-up  
vices   ** 
0.066  .93  0.038  .03 
l 
ristics 
**  ** 
 
  
A 31  0.96 87  2.66
A 0.022  0.54  -0.027  0.55 
Average full-time paramedics  -0. 1
Labo 0.173 1.29  0.195 1.18 
# beds -0.003  0.67  0.014  1.92*
Inpatient  care  0.709 2.87* 0.461 1.84* 
Check-up 0.502  2.94* -0.426  0.68 
Birth  services  -0.666 3.41* -0.492 2.61*
Private - inpatien 0.195  0.63  0.804  2.62*
Private - m -0.179  1.01  na  - 
Private -  0.040  0.40  -0.181  0.71 
Private - birth ser -0.212  0.84  -0.825  3.60*
# private hospital^  0 1
# public hospita 0.081  1.45     
Village Characte      
Urban  area  0.351 3.18* 0.426 3.65*
Minor shock  -0.006  0.08  0.081  0.86 
Major shock  0.097  0.83  -0.256  1.92*
       
Constant  0.621 1.06  0.836 0.85 
       
N  5262   4580  
Log Likelihood -2390.6    -2065.9   
R  squared  0.085   0.085  
 
N public and pri sp re com o make total number of hospitals. 
I o these variables, 12 r u ab a ight are included in 
t imates are logit coefficients, and *, ** no gnificance at 10, 5 and 
1 .  
 
 
ote: ^ in Sample 2,  vate ho itals a bined t
n addition t egional d mmy vari les and s mpling we
he estimation. Est , *** de tes si
% level respectively